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I will start with a short anecdote I’ve heard recently. A few days prior to the elections in Spain, a 
journalist asked a passer-by why he was planning to vote for Rajoy, the leader of the conservative 
party. The answer was: Because what he wants is good for Spain. Question: What does he want? 
Answer: I don’t know and I assume Rajoy doesn’t really know himself. 
I think this anecdote reveals a lot about the state in which contemporary democracies are. Many 
people may still be willing to participate, to play the game of parliamentary democracy, but they do 
not have any convictions. Often they do not vote for a party and its programme, but against the 
previous party in power. However, they should know through experience that disappointment is 
unavoidable, no matter which party is in power. Actually, they do not even expect that things will 
change when persons or parties are replaced, that is, they do not hold other parties to offer serious 
alternatives. The parties, for their part, try to play the game of democratic competition. They disparage 
each other, in order to distract from the fact that their programmes hardly differ. Moreover they are 
permanently in trouble to decide whether they should go along with the needs of the voters or with the 
wishes of markets. 
In describing these dilemmas of contemporary democracy or, as Colin Crouch would say: post-
democracy, I agree with Chantal Mouffe’s critical diagnosis. Democratic politics understood as the 
ability to freely choose between alternative social visions seems to be incompatible with the practical 
constraints of the global capitalist market economy. Politics amounts to nothing but the management 
of the social and economic adjustments, which are necessary to sustain competitiveness in the global 
market, as Robert Cox formulated 15 years ago. The “very idea of possible alternative to the existing 
order has been discredited” as Mouffe formulates. The “stabilization realized under the hegemony of 
neo-liberalism – with its very specific interpretation of what rights are important and non-negotiable – 
is practically unchallenged” (2000, 5). According to Mouffe, the task for democratic theorists and 
politicians should therefore be “to envisage the creation of a vibrant ‘agonistic’ public sphere of 
contestation where different hegemonic political projects can be confronted.” But if politicians have 
no real choice and “if the participants in the discussion are not able to decide between clearly 
differentiated alternatives,” the talk of ‘dialogue’ and ‘deliberation’ is meaningless (2005, 3). 
 
However I have a few questions with regard to some further aspects of Mouffe’s conception of 
agonistic democracy. My first question refers to her criticism of Rawls. Mouffe criticises Rawls’s 
conception of a well-ordered society, because “it tends to erase the very place of the adversary, 
thereby expelling any legitimate opposition from the democratic public sphere.” She continues: “On 
the political level a similar phenomenon is to be found in the case of the ‘third way’” (2000, 14). I do 
not see the similarity between the two positions. I assume Mouffe considers conceptions such as 
Rawls’s reasonable pluralism or Habermas’s rational, all-inclusive deliberation, as too idealistic and 
inadequate for describing real political situations. Even if we agree with this evaluation we should 
distinguish between the political projects of the advocates of the so-called third way, that is of people 
like Giddens, Blair, Clinton, Schröder or Beck on the one hand, and the philosophical conceptions of 
Rawls, Habermas, Cohen or Benhabib on the other. 
In the first case we can indeed say that the idea of politics “beyond left and right” is misleading. Left 
and right still stand for different political projects in societies wherein the conflict of interests between 
economic actors such as capital owners and workers remains one of the big challenges with which 
democratic policies are confronted. Obviously the challenge has even grown in the neoliberal decades. 
But the assertion that reasonable consensus is possible has no ideological implications. An at least 
minimal consensus is vital for a stable political order. I assume that modern democracies will be stable 
only if consensus is possible regarding the necessity of a legal order protecting some fundamental 
rights as well as to the procedures of political decision.  
I think Mouffe is right in asserting that consent to principles of social justice is hardly conceivable in 
contemporary democracies. But I don’t know how deep the dissent between her position and the 
position of Rawls really is. In “The democratic paradox” (2000, 25) she explains “What Rawls is 
really indicating […] is that there cannot be pluralism as far as the principles of the political 
association are concerned, and that conceptions which refuse the principles of liberalism are to be 
excluded. I have no quarrel with him on this issue.” 
In her book On the political she writes: “The pluralism that I advocate requires discriminating between 
demands which are to be accepted as part of the agonistic debate and those which are to be excluded. 
A democratic society cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into question as legitimate 
adversaries”. It cannot allow “the coexistence of conflicting principles of legitimacy in its midst” 
(2005, 120-122). Even in The return of the political she stresses: “I agree with Rawls that a theory of 
justice in a modern democracy should be focused on the means whereby liberty and equality might be 
realized in our institutions” (1993/2005, 52). If these affinities are evident, why does Mouffe disagree 
with Rawls? A first reason seems to be pragmatic rather then normative. One should, as Mouffe 
explains, “take account of the fact that a new ideological terrain has been defined by the attacks of the 
right against state intervention […]. The shortcomings of Rawls on that count are all too evident since 
his theory of justice implies a great amount of state interventions” (1993/2005, 54). This objection 
could also be raised by advocates of the so-called third-way, and I suppose it isn’t conclusive in 
Mouffe’s argument. After all Mouffe concedes, that, “in the context of the aggressive reassertion of 
neoliberalism and its attacks against welfare rights and the widening of the field of equality, Rawls’s 
intentions are commendable” (1993/2005, 53). 
It is probably Mouffe’s conception of the political that explains her disagreement with Rawls. 
“Rawls’s ‘well-ordered society’ rests on the elimination of the very idea of the political” as she 
explains in The return of the political. And she continues: “There is another way in which the political 
is absent in Rawls: the political understood as the symbolic ordering of social relations”. What is a 
symbolic ordering of social relations? If principles such as liberty and equality are valuable for 
citizens of modern democracies, if they are “central signifiers” for them, then the reason is, according 
to Mouffe, “that these are the political principles of the liberal democratic regime”. Citizens of modern 
democracies “have been constructed as subjects in a democratic society whose regime and tradition 
have put those values at the centre of social life” (1993/2005, 51f). If we are constructed or shaped by 
traditions then we are indeed not able to argue as free beings in a rational and reasonable way. But 
how can we then explain that we are able to disagree on the meaning of these concepts in an 
antagonistic manner? 
 
My second disagreement concerns Mouffe’s rejection of rationalism and individualism. Mouffe argues 
that both principles are unsuited to found a conception of the political. She discovered “entirely new 
perspectives for political action, which neither liberalism, with its idea of the individual who only 
pursues his or her own interest, nor Marxism, with its reduction of all subject positions to that of 
class,” can imagine (1993/2005). I, however, would argue that rationalism and individualism are the 
shared theoretical foundations of modern liberalism as well as of Marxism. We shouldn’t forget that 
Marx was a resolute critic of communitarian conceptions, that he mocked the “holy spirit of 
community” (MEW 4, 12). As he emphasizes, a class is not a community based on a strong communal 
spirit. The capitalist class as well as the working class are strategic associations of individuals who 
share some common interests because they have, as capitalists respectively as workers, similar tasks in 
the economic process. But at the same time, and in spite of his class-affiliation, every individual is 
permanently competing with every other individual. Although this situation is not easy to bear for the 
concerned individuals, Marx nevertheless attributes to capitalism the merit to have emancipated 
people. Only in the age of capitalism human beings are free to act as individuals (MEW 3, 54; 67). 
From this point of view, under conditions of rivalry there is no reason to discredit self-interest and 
rational behaviour. As it is well known, Marx denounces the anti-modernist and anti-liberal tendencies 
of socialist doctrines “preaching to the masses that they had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by 
this bourgeois movement.” Modern socialism presupposes “the existence of modern bourgeois society, 
with its corresponding economic conditions of existence, and the political constitution adapted 
thereto” (MEW 4, 487).  
What I want to emphasize is the following point: Although Mouffe distances herself from some 
communitarian ideas she seems to share with Schmitt an anti-bourgeois and anti-modernist attitude. 
According to this attitude, rationalist and individualist theories are incompatible with an antagonistic 
political philosophy. But I think this is not true. As the theory of Marx proves, rationalism and 
antagonism do not contradict each other. Antagonism may result from a clash of different identities or 
we-communities. It, however, mainly results from the conflict between economic interests.  
 My third point concerns the concept of agonistic pluralism and the principles of liberty and equality. 
Like the advocates of ‘political liberalism’, Mouffe would like “to see the creation of a wide 
consensus around the principles of pluralist democracy.” However such a consensus will not result 
from an arrangement between rational agents, but only by “creating strong forms of identification” 
with democratic institutions, by “developing and multiplying […] the discourses, the practices, the 
‘language games’ that produce democratic ‘subject positions’.” Mouffe defines her project as an 
‘ethico-political’ enterprise, “which does not deny the constitutive role of conflict and antagonism and 
the fact that division is irreducible” (1993/2005, 151) How could identification with democratic 
institutions, values or principles be possible? Liberty and equality, the main political principles of 
liberal democracy, “can be interpreted in many different ways and ranked according to different 
priorities” as Mouffe calls to mind (1993/2005, 150). Neoliberalism, the main adversary of the project 
of radical democracy that Mouffe supports, is just one interpretation.   
In The Democratic Paradox Mouffe formulates a slightly different argument. It is, as she explains, 
“vital for democratic politics to understand that liberal democracy results from the articulation of two 
logics which are incompatible in the last instance and that there is no way in which they could be 
perfectly reconciled.” Both logics tend to establish hegemony. However, as Mouffe realizes in 2000, it 
is only nowadays, “that the stabilization realized under the hegemony of neo-liberalism – with its very 
specific interpretation of what rights are important and non-negotiable – is practically unchallenged” 
and the very idea of an alternative to the existing order has disappeared (2000, 5). Is it possible for the 
radical democratic project to challenge the neoliberal hegemony? Mouffe would probably answer: 
Yes, under the condition that we do not look for consensus, but accept “an ‘agonistic confrontation’ 
between conflicting interpretations of the constitutive liberal-democratic values” (2000, 8f). But once 
again: What do we share as members of a polity, if we hold “conflicting” interpretations of the same 
values? How can we be sure that conflicts of interpretation do not undermine the stability of the 
polity? How can we tame antagonism and make it compatible with pluralist democracy, how can we 
transform it in agonism? 
As Marx formulated: “No man combats freedom; at most he combats the freedom of others” (MEW 1, 
51). Nobody combats freedom, but it’s possible that he or she feels threatened by the freedom of his or 
her neighbour. He who understands liberty as negative freedom and she who understands it as positive 
freedom may well be members of the same polity. But I question that advocates of absolute private 
property and critics of the private ownership of big economic resources share a common symbolic 
space – confessing that I don’t know what a common symbolic space is. Nobody combats equality; but 
which aspects of equality should be politically relevant criteria and which not? When denouncing the 
idea of social justice Friedrich von Hayek refers to the principle of equality, that is, the formally equal 
treatment of market actors. A conflict between a political party that demands equal distribution of 
some material resources and a political party that refuses such distribution is an antagonism, and I 
don’t see why the fact that the political actors  involved share the same principles would allow one to 
call this agonism rather than antagonism as long as these actors interpret these principles differently. 
According to Schmitt, a constellation of enmity presupposes feelings of fundamental otherness and 
existential thread – it is possible that in modern capitalist societies property rights may have an 
existential meaning.  
 
My last point refers to what I would like to call Mouffe’s hesitant communitarianism and, once again, 
her Schmittian anti-modernism. It goes without saying that Mouffe distances herself from Schmitt in 
defending a pluralistic democratic order. Such an order “requires that, within the context of the 
political community, the opponent should be considered not as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an 
adversary whose existence is legitimate and must be tolerated” (1993/2005, 4). In a more detailed way 
Mouffe proposes, in The Democratic Paradox, “to distinguish between two forms of antagonism, 
antagonism proper – which takes place between enemies, that is, persons who have no common 
symbolic space – and what I call ‘agonism’, which is a different mode of manifestation of antagonism 
because it involves a relation not between enemies but between ‘adversaries’, adversaries being 
defined in a paradoxical way as ‘friendly enemies’, that is, persons who are friends because they share 
a common symbolic space but also enemies because they want to organize this common symbolic 
space in a different way.” The adversary is the protagonist of agonistic pluralism (2000, 13f). What 
exactly is the difference between adversaries and enemies? According to Mouffe it is the sharing or 
not sharing of common symbolic space. I’ve already confessed that I don’t know what this term 
means. In a more dramatic but also precise way Schmitt speaks of the mortal enemy. A friend-enemy-
relation is a matter of life and death – of course only in the extreme case, but it is only in the extreme 
case that the political arises. 
However, as Mouffe emphasizes, the political shouldn’t appear in its brute form. “Politics, as the 
attempt to domesticate the political, to keep at bay the forces of destruction and to establish order, 
always has to do with conflicts and antagonisms” (2000, 141). Consequently, politics should direct the 
initially destructive forces of the political in the peaceful course of agonism. But is it reasonable to 
reduce “the political” respectively “antagonism proper” to the destruction of people considered as 
enemies? Conflicts between economic actors with opposing interests can be quite antagonistic without 
being a matter of life and death. Antagonism concerns conceptions of the legal order, mainly of 
property rights, as well as the distribution of political and economic power. The transformation of 
constitutions, of systems of production and distribution may well have revolutionary traits, and indeed 
I think that the neoliberal politics of the last three decades have had revolutionary effects. Inescapably, 
by their adversaries radical political projects will be denounced as revolutionary, i.e. illegitimate. I do 
not fully understand Mouffe’s position in this debate. She contrasts acts of radical refoundation and 
radical reforms (2005, 33), but what exactly is the difference between the two? Is not the question of 
what distinguishes them also a matter of disputed interpretation? If, as Mouffe seems to indicate, 
revolutionary politics is nothing but a kind of Schmittian friend/enemy confrontation, then it 
inevitably provokes the “destruction of the political association.” However, it is a matter of 
interpretation whether a political project causes the destruction of the political association or “a 
profound transformation of the existing power relations and the establishment of a new hegemony” 
(2005, 51f), as Mouffe defines the aim of the agonistic perspective.  
To sum up, I have two objections to Mouffe’s conception of agonistic or radical democratic politics. 
First, it neglects the economic dimension of power and the transformation of the economic order. 
When it refers to socialism then it presents it in an undetermined way as “a necessary component of 
the project of radical and plural democracy,” as an indication of “the necessity of breaking with the 
universalistic and individualistic modes of thought” of liberalism or as a tradition which can “free 
political liberalism from the hindrances of universalism and individualism” (2000, 90; 99f). 
My second objection once again refers to the anti-rationalism, anti-individualism and implicit 
communitarianism. In order to keep the emergence of antagonism at bay, Mouffe recommends 
strategies of identification, of the establishment of we-communities (2005, 16). Rationalist and 
individualist conceptions of politics completely miss the nature of “the political”, that is: “the whole 
dimension of power and antagonism.” According to Mouffe, “in the field of politics, it is groups and 
collective identities that we encounter, not isolated individuals, and its dynamics cannot be 
apprehended by reducing it to individual calculations” (2000, 140). She underlines the affective 
dimension of voting, the importance of sentiments and passions (2005, 25; 28f). If, as she claims, a 
new hegemony must be constructed, the building of such hegemony implies “a ‘we’ of the radical 
democratic forces. This can be done only by the determination of a ‘they’, the adversary that has to be 
defeated in order to make the new hegemony possible” (2005, 53). The aim should be “the political 
creation of a unity through common identification with a particular interpretation of its political 
principles, a specific understanding of citizenship.” According to this conception, the task of political 
philosophy should be the offering of different interpretations of notions like justice, equality or liberty 
(1993/2005, 115). 
Critical observers of contemporary democracy are sometimes tempted to say that citizens today have 
nothing but the right to express their dissatisfaction once in for or five years. In Mouffe’s conception, 
they have – as a “we” – at least the right to emotional identification with “their own” group and to 
dissociation from adversaries, who share the same symbolic space, but not the same interpretations. 
But this we/they separation or confrontation is of no interest to radical politics as long as it is not clear 
which contents and projects may cause associations and dissociations. 
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